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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Assessing the Political Impacts of  
a Conditional Cash Transfer: Evidence from a Randomized  
Policy Experiment  
 
Julia E. Tobias (Global Innovation Fund, London, U.K.),  
Sudarno Sumarto (The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia), and 
Habib Moody (The Urban Institute, Washington D.C., USA) 
 
 
Several developing nations, including Indonesia, have experimented with conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) to poor households during recent years. Since 2007, Indonesia has been 
carrying out a randomized CCT pilot program (PNPM Generasi) in 1,625 villages where funds 
are disbursed to communities rather than households, and local councils allocate the funds to 
public projects following community input. In this paper, we explore political outcomes 
associated with the program, including electoral rewards for incumbents, and political 
participation. By comparing regions receiving the program with a control group, we estimate 
the CCT’s effects on political behavior in the 2009 elections for president and the national 
legislative assembly, and we also explore its effects on local politics. We find that the CCT 
program increases vote shares for legislative candidates from the incumbent president’s party, 
improves households’ satisfaction with kabupaten-level government administrative services, and 
decreases competition among presidential candidates as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). We do not find conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the program increases votes for the incumbent president, and we find no evidence that the 
program significantly increases voter turnout or affects village-level politics. 
 
 
Keywords: conditional cash transfer, political behavior, Indonesia 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Overview 
 
In recent years, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have become one of the dominant strategies 
of governments in developing countries to deliver social safety nets for the poor. These 
programs, which now exist in over thirty countries, generally aim to alleviate poverty both in 
the short- and the long-term, the former through cash transfers and the latter through 
increasing investments in human capital (Fiszbein et al., 2009). The basic model for CCTs 
comes from Mexico’s Progresa program, which provides grants to households conditional on 
meeting certain health and education requirements. Several countries in Latin America and 
elsewhere have recently been developing their own variants of such programs. From 2007 to 
2009, the Government of Indonesia launched a pilot conditional cash transfer sub-program of 
the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) called PNPM Generasi, which 
is now being scaled up nationally.  
 
PNPM Generasi provides block grants, equivalent to roughly US$10,000, to kecamatan (sub-
districts) to be spent on health and education projects. The World Bank assisted the 
government in randomly assigning 300 kecamatan to control and treatment groups in order to 
facilitate an extensive impact evaluation of the pilot. The evaluation, currently in progress, 
measures primarily PNPM Generasi’s achievement of its main goals: improving health and 
education outcomes (Jonishi, Olken, and Wong, 2010). In this paper, we test the hypothesis 
that the program may have also affected several political outcomes, including electoral support 
for incumbents and political participation. 
 
PNPM Generasi builds upon other CCT models by adding an innovative feature of targeting 
funds to communities rather than to individual households. Indonesia is the first country to 
test this type of innovation, which combines the traditional CCT model with a community-
driven development approach, where community forums are involved in allocating funds to 
village-level development priorities. This participatory approach recognizes that CCTs to 
households are not effective in areas where supply-side constraints hinder the provision of 
health and education services. For example, requirements that children must be enrolled in 
school or that pregnant women must visit health professionals for pre-natal care in order to 
receive the cash transfer cannot be enforced where there are insufficient school or hospital 
facilities. In such settings, block grants that allow communities to decide how to use the funds 
in the best way may be more effective than channeling funds directly to households (World 
Bank, 2008). In addition to the potential social and economic benefits of this approach, we 
hypothesize that block grants may also have the attractive features of being politically 
desirable and capable of generating rewards for incumbents, while also building up political 
participation by encouraging community empowerment. 
 
Existing research on the effectiveness of both community-driven development programs and 
CCT programs generally tends to focus on human development outcomes, with little attention 
given to the potential political effects of such programs. While several evaluations suggest that 
such community-driven development programs are beneficial to their recipients, as measured 
by key social and economic indicators (for example, Björkman and Svensson, 2007; Fearon, 
Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009; Stiglitz, 2002), their consequences for democratic behavior, 
such as participation in national elections are not yet well understood. Similarly, despite a 
growing number of studies on the economic impact of household CCTs (Handa and Davis, 
2006; Skoufias and Parker, 2001), we are aware of only a few recent studies on their political 
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effects, with the evidence being largely limited to the Latin American cases of Mexico and 
Brazil (De La O, 2013; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni, 2012; Zucco, 2010). From a 
policy perspective, the political impacts of these programs are particularly important given the 
potential implications for their long-term sustainability. 
 
Three hundred kecamatan in five provinces were randomly assigned either to an untreated 
control group or to a group receiving the PNPM Generasi program that begun in June 2007. 
Over the next two years, treated kecamatan received annual grants of roughly US$10,000 to be 
allocated by local councils to health- and education-related projects, with the assistance of 
trained facilitators.1 The overall treatment group included two randomized variants of the 
program (see Figure 1): 1) half of the treated kecamatan were assigned to an “incentivized” 
version of the treatment, where in addition to receiving a fixed amount of funds, villages were 
eligible to receive an additional 20% in bonus funds during the second year of PNPM 
Generasi, contingent upon first-year performance against a set of health and education 
benchmarks; 2) the other half of the treated kecamatan received a “non-incentivized” version, 
where funds in the second year did not depend on first-year performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Assignment Procedure 
Source: Olken, Onishi, and Wong, 2008: 11. 
  
                                                 
1The precise size of the block grant that kecamatan were eligible to receive was pre-determined based on the 
population and the poverty level of the kecamatan. 
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Our research tests the main hypothesis that the CCT program has positive effects on 
incumbent re-election and on political participation. We explore these outcomes using new 
locally disaggregated data on Indonesia’s April 2009 election for the House of Representatives 
(DPR) and the July 2009 presidential election, and unique detailed data on political behavior at 
the village-level and kabupaten-level. We supplement our key outcome measures—incumbent 
vote shares and voter participation—with several additional measures that aim to capture 
potential effects of the CCT on local government capacity, political activeness, and the entry 
of women, minorities, and younger candidates into village-level political offices. We expect the 
CCT to impact the national-level elections (presidential and general elections), since the CCT 
is a central government initiative, but we also explore the possibility that beneficiaries may 
credit the lower levels of government for the benefits associated with the program, or that the 
CCT may affect participation in local politics.  
 
We expect these outcomes for several reasons. The first rationale is aligned with the more 
traditional household conditional cash transfer approach of Mexico, Brazil, and several other 
nations: social transfers promise better lives for the poor, and thus a healthier relationship 
with government. If voting serves as a lever to punish or reward incumbents, then winning the 
lottery in a randomized policy experiment that provides program benefits should cause voters 
to turn out in support of their current government (Hastings et al., 2007). The second 
rationale relates to the unique community-driven approach of the CCT, which engages 
communities in discussion forums and voting on project proposals to determine the allocation 
of funds. Olken (2010) finds that direct participation in the decision-making process of a 
community development program in Indonesia significantly increases perceived legitimacy and 
satisfaction with this program. We take this logic a step further and expect that communities’ 
experience with democratic decision-making processes at the local level in a context specific 
to the program may translate into greater participation in politics in general.  
 
We do not have a strong prior hypothesis on whether to expect any difference between the 
incentivized versus non-incentivized treatments, but since this additional layer of 
randomization was built into the program design, we take advantage of the opportunity to 
explore the arising differences in political outcomes across these groups. We expect that the 
incentivized treatment may have stronger effects on voter participation and support for the 
incumbent, since this program variant is more effective in engaging community members and 
achieving program outcomes. The reverse scenario is also possible, however; since the 
incentivized program shifts the locus of control over program outcomes toward the 
community, it may shift credit for the program away from political leaders. 
 
To preview our results, we find that the CCT program increases vote shares for legislative 
candidates from the incumbent president’s party, improves the households’ assessments of 
kabupaten-level government administrative services, and decreases the competition among 
presidential candidates, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). We find no 
conclusive evidence that the program significantly increases votes for the incumbent 
president, increases voter turnout, or affects village-level politics. 
 
It is important to note that we regard the examined political outcomes as potential side effects 
of the PNPM Generasi program, since these outcomes were never explicitly articulated as 
program goals; the focus of the program was mainly on improving health and education 
development outcomes. Our findings are thus not intended to be interpreted as evidence of 
the success or failure of the program. Instead, we explore the political effects of CCTs with a 
view that, whether intentional or not, these effects may potentially have strong relevance to 
the future sustainability of such programs in the context of democratic developing countries. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the government also piloted a different CCT program during 
the same time period, known as Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), the Hopeful Family 
Program, with funds targeted directly to households rather than communities. We will not 
analyze this program at this point, however, due to data constraints and because PKH was 
subject to some non-random selection. Additionally, a direct comparison of the effects of 
PNPM Generasi’s community CCT approach and PKH’s household CCT approach is 
difficult due to different initial sampling procedures of both programs. We plan to analyze the 
PKH program separately in the future, subject to data availability. For now, we note that there 
is no overlap between the treatment and control groups assigned to PKH and PNPM 
Generasi, so potential spillover effects between areas receiving the different programs should 
not be a concern. 
 
 
1.2  Review of Literature 
 
A large body of existing research provides evidence that in developing countries, social 
programs are often governed by traditional-style clientelistic politics, where politicians target 
private benefits toward certain individuals in exchange for votes and the benefits may be 
withdrawn if voters do not fulfill their commitments.2 The recent types of CCTs differ from 
such clientelistic programs, however, in that funds are allocated according to rules-based 
formulas that minimize the discretion over the process. Generally, the selection of regions for 
CCT programs is based on geographic targeting procedures that favor poorer regions, and the 
disbursement of funds to households or communities within selected regions is conditional on 
the achievement of the program’s health and education requirements rather than on the 
interest of politicians. While the design of CCT programs and their levels of independence 
from politics may vary across countries, CCTs generally tend to be much harder for politicians 
to manipulate than traditional transfer programs, and the benefits cannot be easily targeted 
toward or withdrawn from particular households or communities. Understanding the extent 
to which CCT programs are associated with electoral rewards or other political effects can 
give an insight into the long-term political will of a government to implement CCTs as 
alternatives to traditional social transfers. 
 
Research on the political effects of CCTs has emerged only recently, and most of the existing 
empirical work is limited to non-randomized analyses that focus exclusively on Latin 
American countries. Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2012) use matching techniques to 
calculate electoral returns of Mexico’s Progresa, for example, and find the program generates 
electoral gains for the incumbent party and its candidates, although these gains are not as great 
as those induced through previous clientelistic vote-buying strategies and discretional 
transfers. Similarly, Zucco (2010) provides evidence, using observational data, that Brazil’s 
CCT program, Bolsa Família, provided electoral returns to the incumbent president Lula da 
Silva in the 2006 election. These authors’ methods assume that participation in the program 
can be considered as an exogenous variable due to the inclusion of covariates, which, 
however, is a strong and potentially questionable assumption. In another recent study, 
Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2010) examine Uruguay’s CCT using a regression 
discontinuity approach, and provide evidence that Uruguay’s PANES program increased the 
support for the current government relative to the previous administration by 11–14 
percentage points. However, the regression discontinuity method they use faces the potential 
                                                 
2For example, Stokes (2005) provides evidence of the politics of patronage in Argentina’s Trabajar public 
employment scheme; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2012) provide evidence of clientelistic politics in 
Mexico’s PRONASOL program, the predecessor to Progresa.  
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problem that the sample of data clustered around the discontinuity threshold may be limited, 
while the expanded interval around the threshold carries the risk of making the estimates 
biased. Further, similar to the approach of Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2012) and 
due to the unavailability of official electoral data, Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2010) 
infer voting behavior from exit poll data, though such data may be inaccurate. 
 
The only randomized evaluation of the political effects of a CCT program of which we are 
aware is De La O (2010), which finds that the Progresa randomized conditional cash transfer 
program boosted the turnout in Mexico’s 2000 elections by 7% and increased the incumbent’s 
vote share by 16%. Our study builds upon these findings by testing the hypothesis that CCTs 
may provide electoral advantages to incumbents and increase political participation in the 
context of Indonesia, a developing country outside Latin America. We also examine the political 
outcomes of CCTs at two levels: the national one and the local one. This is in contrast to all of 
the studies described above, which focused exclusively on the central level. We are able analyze a 
detailed set of political measures, going beyond incumbent vote shares and voter participation, 
as our data contains official electoral results and household survey responses. 
 
Our hypothesis is consistent with theories of retrospective voting, where politicians are 
rewarded for providing desirable goods or services to their constituents (Key, 1961), and 
politicians’ past performance is viewed as a predictor of future performance (Fiorina, 1981). 
Even if politicians cannot directly punish CCT beneficiaries who do not vote for them, it may 
be rational for CCT beneficiaries to vote for incumbents as a response to receiving the 
program. For example, in an environment where voters lack perfect information on the 
incumbent’s performance and the quality of their economic policy, receipt of the conditional 
cash transfer can plausibly be interpreted as evidence of a political commitment to continuing 
such programs or to catering to the poor in general. The logic of our hypothesis fits with the 
finding of Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2006) that economic issues are central to 
voters in comparison with moral or ideological concerns. Reciprocity may also play a role in 
helping to explain why CCT recipients might be likely to vote for a government that has 
initiated such a program (Cox et al., 2007; Gneezy and List, 2006; Regan, 1971), regardless of 
whether future benefits are contingent upon supporting the political incumbents. This type of 
behavior differs from vote-buying or clientelism (Stokes, 2005) in that it does not necessarily 
pose a threat to democracy; in fact, a certain level of electoral responsiveness to conditional 
cash transfers may be necessary to sustain the political will for such programs.  
 
Indonesia is an excellent setting to test our hypotheses, as no other nation has introduced 
participatory development programs on such a large scale. The introduction of a randomized 
CCT facilitates our empirical analysis and allows us to measure the causal effects of the 
program while alleviating potential concerns about the endogeneity bias. Much of the existing 
research that attempts to infer how social transfer programs affect voting behavior by 
comparing recipients’ voting patterns with those of non-recipients’ faces the challenge that 
funds are often targeted based on socioeconomic criteria, which tend to predict political 
behavior, or are targeted based on political characteristics. For example, if politicians tend to 
direct transfers toward their core supporters, any relationship detected between receipt of the 
transfer and higher support for incumbents may be spurious. The randomization of the 
PNPM Generasi program provides a source of exogenous variation that allows us to compute 
unbiased estimates of changes in voting behavior that can be attributed to receiving the 
program, rather than to pre-existing differences between recipients and non-recipients.  
 
Additionally, the community-based development model embedded in the PNPM Generasi 
program, where funds are distributed to communities at the kecamatan level rather than to 
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individual households, implies that the CCT might enhance political participation. Greater 
local participation in decision-making through the program might increase voter turnout 
through empowering poor citizens; engagement with one’s community in problem-solving 
and decision-making may reinforce the trust, commitment, and group identity of stakeholders, 
feeding political energies that find later expression in voting (Ostrom, 1998). Recent findings 
lend support to the significance of personal contact and social pressure in shaping political 
behavior. For example, in get-out-the-vote field experiments, doorstep canvassing is more 
effective than direct mail and scripted telephone appeals by several percentage points (Gerber 
and Green, 2000). Our paper is not able to distinguish between different potential causal 
mechanisms that may be responsible for the political effects we observe, but we hope that this 
discussion of plausible causal mechanisms suggests useful avenues for future research. 
 
 
 
II. ORIGINS OF PNPM GENERASI: INDONESIAN SOCIAL 
PROTECTION SINCE 1998 
 
 
The development of a modern system of social protection in Indonesia began in response to the 
Asian economic crisis of 1997. As panicked investors withdrew funds from overheated markets, 
the value of the Indonesian rupiah declined by 85% and the poverty rate increased from 15% to 
33% in one year. Mass deprivation provoked rioting in major cities, leading to the downfall, in 
May 1998, of the 33-year Suharto dictatorship. With support from several international donors, 
including the World Bank, the new government immediately introduced a social safety net (JPS) 
to mitigate the effects of the crisis on Indonesia’s poorest citizens. These programs included the 
Special Market Program (OPK)—a rice and basic commodity subsidy program, ‘labor intensive’ 
employment creation programs, health sector programs, and a scholarship program. 
 
The government also moved swiftly to reduce regressive but politically entrenched fuel 
subsidies, a holdover from the Suharto era, and redirected the savings toward more equitable 
social protection initiatives. The subsidies were first slashed by 12% in October 2000, and 
further reduced, following rising government spending on fuel, as crude oil prices surged in 
2005 and 2008. Both the 2005 and 2008 reductions were accompanied by an Unconditional 
Cash Transfer (BLT) program (introduced in 2005 in Indonesia for the first time), which 
delivered unconditional quarterly tranches of cash to cushion the adverse effects of price 
shocks on the poor. The initiative reached 19 million statistically identified poor households 
and lasted between October 2005 to October 2006 and June 2008 to December 2008. Recent 
evidence suggests that the program brought some substantial welfare gains to the households 
reached, although both the targeting and coverage of BLT were flawed (World Bank, 2006).  
 
At the same time, after years of Suharto’s authoritarianism and a legacy of endemic 
corruption, Indonesian officials also sought to use community-driven development to 
decentralize the provision of public goods. In 1998, the government began issuing pilot grants 
to rural kecamatan to spend on infrastructure projects, most commonly roads, under the 
auspices of a new national program, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). Under the 
program, grants of roughly US$8,000 were disbursed to villages within kecamatan via an inter-
village forum. The process was competitive: proposals were ranked in a voting process, and 
once a proposal was chosen, an implementation team was elected. Urban communities were 
eligible to participate in a similar program, the Urban Poverty Project (UPP), where grants of 
up to US$50,000 funded training, community organizations, infrastructure development and 
microcredit. Over several phases in the early 2000s, these initiatives grew to comprise the 
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largest participatory development program in the world, expanding from a handful of sites to 
over half of Indonesia’s villages by 2007. 
 
Starting in 2006, Indonesia revamped its schemes of transfers to households and communities 
(for a full timeline, see Figure 2). President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has declared the 
country’s unconditional cash transfer program a success, but stated that further transfers 
would be restructured to more effectively promote development objectives. To replace the 
BLT, the central government, with the World Bank’s assistance, announced the PKH, wherein 
payments to households would be disbursed conditional on achieving a series of health- and 
education-related benchmarks. Cash transfers to communities were restructured under the 
new umbrella of the PNPM, which now administers three initiatives; the KDP and UPP 
programs have been enhanced and renamed as PNPM-Urban and PNPM-Rural (which 
support PNPM-Mandiri3), while the third initiative, PNPM Generasi, provides block grants to 
communities for health and education projects rather than infrastructure, conditional on 
commitments to improve the same set of health and education outcomes as in PKH. This 
paper focuses on PNPM Generasi. 
 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of Events 
Source: Olken, Onishi, and Wong, 2011. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes graphically the four stages of a PNPM Generasi treatment cycle, which 
lasts twelve to fourteen months. First, in the “socialization” stage, government-trained 
facilitators introduce the program and its goals to the kecamatan’s villages. Villagers are told 
                                                 
3PNPM-Mandiri is a poverty reduction program launched by the Government of Indonesia in 2007. 
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generated significant positive hype during the reign of the SBY [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] 
government” (The Jakarta Post, 2009a). In some cases, the president made widely publicized 
visits during his campaign tours to hand over funds from the central government to local 
governments. During the distribution of PNPM funds in the Lampung Province, for example, 
The Jakarta Post quoted one villager as saying, “I hope that [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] will 
be elected again to president. Villagers here admire him so much because he has helped them 
[through the aid schemes]” (The Jakarta Post, 2009a). When public opinion polls showed 
spikes in approval ratings for the president and his party in October and November 2008, the 
rise in popularity was widely attributed in the press to a recent advertising campaign 
promoting and raising public awareness about these programs. The advertisements, which 
were funded by the state as program-related expenses, were criticized as being essentially 
political advertisements (The Jakarta Post, 2008). This paper is the first to empirically test 
these types of anecdotal speculations about a possible link between the PNPM program and 
political outcomes.  
 
 
Box 1.  
List of CCT Program Conditional Benchmarks 
 
For pregnant mothers 
1. Four pre-natal care visits 
2. Receipt of iron supplement tablets during pregnancy 
3. Delivery assisted by a midwife or doctor 
4. Two post-natal care visits 
 
For children under five 
1. Complete childhood immunizations 
2. Ensuring monthly weight increases for infants 
3. Monthly weighing of children under three and bi-annually of children under five 
4. Vitamin A supplement tablets twice a year for under-fives 
 
For school-aged children 
1. Elementary school enrollment of all children aged between seven and 12 years old 
2. Minimum attendance rate of 85% for all elementary school-aged children 
3. Junior high school enrollment of all 13 to 15 year-old children 
 
 
 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
 
Five Indonesian provinces were initially selected to receive PNPM Generasi: East Java, West 
Java, Gorontalo, North Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara. In Indonesia, a province 
comprises many kabupaten (districts), a kabupaten comprises many kecamatan, a kecamatan 
comprises many villages (desa/kelurahan4), and a village comprises many sub-villages 
(RT5/RW6/dusun7). Within selected provinces, treatments were assigned according to the 
                                                 
4A kelurahan is a village level administrative area located in an urban center. 
5An RT, or a neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of 
households. 
6An RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units) within a kelurahan. 
7A dusun is an administrative area within a village, consisting of a number of RT.  
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following process. First, kabupaten were ranked according to their wealth on the basis of 
poverty, school transition, and malnourishment rates, and the richest 20% of kabupaten were 
excluded.8 Then, among kabupaten already receiving KDP grants9, twenty kabupaten were 
randomly selected for PNPM Generasi and stratified by province. In Gorontalo and North 
Sulawesi, the set of kabupaten was small enough that every eligible kabupaten was selected. 
Within the selected kabupaten, all kecamatan previously treated with the UPP or where less than 
30% of the villages and urban precincts are classified as rural by Statistics Indonesia (BPS) 
were eliminated.  
 
A control group and two treatment groups were randomly drawn from the remaining set of 
300 kecamatan, stratified by kabupaten. Both treatments were identical, except that in the 
“incentivized” treatment, villages were eligible to receive bonus funds of up to 20% of a 
village’s fixed baseline allotment during the second year of PNPM Generasi, contingent upon 
first year performance; in the “non-incentivized treatment,” second-year funding did not 
depend on first-year performance. Groups were evenly split (n = 100). Overall program 
compliance rates were high: only 22 of the 200 kecamatan that were supposed to receive either 
variant of the program did not receive the program at all between 2007 and 2009. Delays to 
the program start-up date did occur in some cases, however, as can be expected with 
development programs in the field: 129 of the kecamatan assigned to treatment were treated in 
the first cycle, beginning in 2007, while 49 were treated in the second cycle, starting in 2008.10 
Figure 1 displays, by province, the assignment of kecamatan to experimental groups. 
 
 
 
IV. BACKGROUND ON ELECTORAL POLITICS IN 
INDONESIA 
 
 
This section provides background information on Indonesian politics, useful for 
understanding the political outcomes analyzed in this paper. The goal is to provide a quick 
snapshot of Indonesia’s political landscape, with emphasis on electoral politics at the national 
and sub-national levels. We focus on the 2009 elections which are analyzed in this paper. 
 
Elections for seats in the DPR are held every five years, before the presidential elections, and 
party support garnered in the legislative elections determines which parties can field 
candidates in the presidential election. Indonesia’s April 2009 DPR elections had over 30 
parties fielding candidates. The most votes were won by PD (20.85%), the Golkar Party 
(14.45%), and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) (14.03%).  
 
The president serves a five-year term with a two-term maximum. The July 2009 presidential 
election was contested by three candidates:  
(i)  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly referred to by his initials, SBY), the incumbent 
president, who previously served as a high-ranking military commander and then as 
minister of mining and energy before helping to establish the PD;  
                                                 
8Data on kabupaten-level socioeconomic variables came from Indonesia’s National Socioeconomic Survey 
(Susenas).  
9The purpose of this requirement was to ensure some prior experience with local infrastructure programs. 
10Reasons for the program delays were typically related to funding issues at the central government level. 
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(ii)  Megawati Sukarnoputri, a former president (2001–2004) and leader of the PDI-P who 
had been an opposition candidate in the 2004 presidential elections. She is also the 
daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, who presided over Indonesia’s transition 
to independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945; and 
(iii)  Jusuf Kalla, a former businessman and then incumbent chairman of the Golkar Party, who 
served as President Yudhoyono’s vice president during his first term in office (2004–2009).  
 
President Yudhoyono won a landslide victory in the election, capturing 60.8% of the vote in 
the election, exceeding the minimum constitutional threshold required to be declared the 
winner without the necessity of a run-off between the top two candidates, as had been 
required between President Yudhoyono and Megawati in the 2004 elections. Megawati and 
Kalla won 26.8% and 12.4% of votes, respectively. President Yudhoyono is the first president 
to be elected directly in Indonesia since democracy was introduced in 1998 after the fall of 
Suharto, whose authoritarian rule over the country lasted for over three decades (1967–1998).  
 
Regarding local politics, Indonesia has begun decentralizing its democracy over the past 
decade. Gubernatorial and kabupaten/kota (district/city) head elections, positions which were 
appointed during the Suharto era, were phased in, starting in 2005, with staggered timing 
across the country. Gubernatorial and kabupaten head elections are scheduled to occur every 
five years. Below the kabupaten level, kecamatan heads are appointed, and village/kelurahan 
heads are elected according to staggered schedules every five to eight years, kelurahan heads 
are appointed by kabupaten-level officials. Kabupaten heads usually have political party 
affiliations, while village heads are banned from joining political parties. Villages are also 
required by law to form elected legislative bodies, Village Representative Councils (BPD), 
which serve the functions of assisting with the village governance and checking the power 
of the village head, though so far the implementation of this law has been somewhat uneven 
across regions. 
 
 
 
V. DATA  
 
 
5.1  Description of Data  
 
Our primary source of data is the World Bank Indonesia’s Health and Education Services 
Survey, a longitudinal panel study that includes a baseline survey conducted from June to August 
2007 before the start of PNPM Generasi, and an endline survey conducted from October to 
December 2009 on the full set of randomized treatment and control kecamatan. The survey data 
include in-person survey interviews with household respondents and village leaders.11 Eight 
villages were randomly selected from each kecamatan and one sub-village was randomly chosen 
from each village. From each sub-village, five household respondents were selected, stratified to 
include higher representation of the program target groups (for example, households with 
women of child-bearing age or school-aged children).12 13 Additionally, one respondent per 
                                                 
11The World Bank CCT Baseline Survey Report (2007) provides more details on the survey sampling procedure.  
12Specifically, households in each kecamatan were categorized into three groups: i) households with pregnant or 
breastfeeding mothers or married women pregnant during the last two years; ii) households with children aged 
between six and 15 years of age; iii) other households. The five respondents per kecamatan were then chosen as 
follows: two from group i, two from group ii, and one from group iii (CCT Baseline Survey Report,: 11). 
13In later drafts of this paper, we plan to use sample weights equal to the inverse of a respondent’s sampling 
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village (the village head if available, or otherwise an alternate village leader such as the village 
secretary) completed the village leader survey and provided data on official voting records. In 
total, there were over 10,000 household survey respondents and roughly 2,000 village leader 
respondents in 20 kabupaten (300 kecamatan). We aggregate all of the data to the kecamatan level 
(the unit of randomization). Each kecamatan is coded by its assigned treatment status and its 
actual treatment status, including the year of PNPM Generasi’s introduction and whether the 
kecamatan received the incentivized or non-incentivized treatment.  
 
Since Indonesian electoral data disaggregated below the kabupaten level are generally not publicly 
available, this survey’s data provide a unique insight into several political variables of interest to 
this research. The survey includes several questions on political outcomes, which we roughly 
divide into the following five categories: (i) support for incumbents and political competition; (ii) 
voter participation; (iii) political access and local government capacity; (iv) satisfaction with 
public services; and (v) political entry into the office of village head. Wherever possible, we 
explore the potential political impacts of PNPM Generasi at multiple tiers of government, 
including the central, kabupaten-level, and village-level politics. We are grateful to the World 
Bank for the opportunity to assist in developing these sections of the survey. 
 
5.1.1  Support for Incumbents and Political Competition 
 
The first section on support for incumbents and political competition explores data collected 
from village leaders’ official records on votes for each candidate in the April 2009 legislative 
election and July 2009 presidential election, disaggregated to the village level, and in the most 
recent village head election.14 We construct several indicators using these data, including the 
share of votes for the incumbent president, the share of votes for legislative candidates from 
the president’s PD, and the incumbent village head’s vote share. The data on legislative 
candidates includes the vote share percentages only for the top three candidates from each 
village; we use these data to create two variables: the combined vote share of all PD 
candidates (out of the total votes recorded), and a dummy variable for whether the first-place 
candidate is from the PD (“PD_WINNER”). We also construct two standard indicators to 
measure overall levels of competition in the presidential election and the village head 
elections: (i) the HHI, equal to the sum of squared vote shares of all candidates, where 
0=perfect competition and 1=no competition; and (ii) the winning margin of victory, equal to 
the difference in vote shares between the top two candidates, where closer differences imply 
stronger competition. We are unable to analyze voting in kabupaten head elections, since only 
few kabupaten in the sample had elections scheduled during the 2007–2009 time period of the 
CCT pilot. The survey also includes information on the total number of political parties that 
visited the villages in the past year. We assume that such visits, which coincided with the 
campaign period for the legislative and presidential elections, were usually instances where 
party members gave speeches or held political rallies for the campaign. We regard this as a 
proxy for the level of political attention given to the villages by national political parties, or 
essentially, the political importance of villages, as perceived by higher-level politicians.15 Note 
that at each level of politics, we explore the extent to which the CCT brings electoral rewards 
to incumbents as well as its effects on political competition within the system as a whole.16 
                                                 
probability (borrowed from forthcoming World Bank computations) so that our results are more representative 
of the general population.  
14Note that we have verified in a small sample of villages that the election data provided by village heads is 
identical or nearly identical to the official records held at the local general elections commission (KPU) office. 
15Note that village heads are prohibited from having political party affiliations. 
16Also, note that since Indonesian law requires village heads to be democratically elected only in villages 
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5.1.2  Voter Participation 
 
Second, we explore voter participation outcomes using data from both the village leaders and 
household surveys to test whether PNPM Generasi affects political participation. As noted 
earlier, the village survey provides information on total votes cast in the presidential, 
legislative, and most recent village head elections, which can be used to infer voter 
participation at the village level. Because data on the total number of registered or eligible 
voters is not available, we use the village adult population (from the village head survey) in the 
denominator of these participation measures, following the approach of De La O (2010). As 
an additional measure to cross-check the data reported by village leaders, the household 
survey asks respondents whether they participated in the most recent: (i) presidential election; 
(ii) legislative election; and (iii) village head election (in areas where a village head election 
occurred during the past two years). It was considered to be too sensitive to ask households to 
report which candidate they voted for in these elections so the latter type of household-level 
data only measures turnout rather than vote shares. For all voter participation data, we report 
the overall participation rates as well as participation rates disaggregated by gender. 
 
5.1.3  Political Access/Activity and Local Government Capacity 
 
The third section examines several variables that are proxies of local government capacity, 
political access, and levels of political activity. We expect that PNPM Generasi may strengthen 
local government institutions and give communities a stronger political voice through 
community meetings, discussions, leadership selection procedures, budget planning, voting 
and consensus-building on project decisions. From the village leader survey, we use 
information on the total number of protests to the kabupaten government during the past year 
as measure of political activeness. We also investigate the number of times that village officials 
invited or visited higher-level government offices for meetings (and vice versa), as a measure 
of the village’s access to higher-level government resources. Specifically, we focus on meetings 
with the members of the DPR, provincial and kabupaten-level Houses of Representatives 
(DPRD), and kabupaten heads. As a proxy for local government capacity, we analyze data on 
BPD, which are not yet functional everywhere, although their existence is mandated by law. 
The data include whether or not the BPD exists and the total number of the board meetings 
held during the past three months. As a final measure of local government activity at the 
village level, we ask the respondents to report whether they currently participate in any village-
level government institutions or groups. 
 
5.1.4  Satisfaction with Public Services 
 
To measure the changes in satisfaction with government services, we use several questions 
asked in the household survey. The first question asks households to evaluate any change in 
the quality of administrative services provided by the kabupaten government during the past 
two years using a three-point scale (1=worsened; 2=same; 3=improved), while the second 
asks households to report their level of satisfaction with kabupaten government services 
provided in the same time period on a four-point scale. The same questions are also asked 
about village-level government services. Examples of common services typically provided at 
these levels of government include the issuance of various permits, licenses, and resident 
identity cards. The PNPM program did not specifically intend to improve these types of 
services, so we are cautious in interpreting these indicators, but we expect that they may 
                                                 
(kelurahan heads are appointed by heads of kabupaten/kota), kelurahan are dropped from the sample for the 
questions relevant to village head elections. For this subset of questions, we also examine only villages with 
elections occurring between the start of the PNPM program and the endline survey collection.  
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reflect the general levels of satisfaction with village-level and kabupaten-level government 
performance that PNPM might affect. 
 
5.1.5  Political Entry into the Office of Village Head  
 
We also explore the extent to which PNPM Generasi may empower certain groups to be 
more politically active, given that the program involves community members in numerous 
participatory decision-making processes and might foster conditions for new leadership to 
emerge. Using data on demographic characteristics of village heads elected after the start of 
the program, we focus on the entry of groups who have not traditionally held positions of 
power in village politics, including women (who represent less than 7% of village heads in the 
baseline survey). Several components of PNPM Generasi specifically target women due to 
their important role in helping to achieve the program’s education and maternal and child 
health goals; the program also required the formation of women’s groups, which were to 
submit project proposals to reflect the concerns of women in the communities. Additionally, 
we look at whether the program leads to the election of better-educated village leaders, using a 
seven-point categorical scale that records the highest level of educational attainment (1=no 
schooling or incomplete elementary schooling; 7=post-graduate degree). We also look at 
whether PNPM Generasi encourages the election of younger candidates as village heads, 
which might suggest a move away from traditional leadership by village elders. Finally, we 
examine whether the program empowers candidates from poorer or smaller sub-villages, 
which might indicate a shift to a more inclusive democracy. The logic here is that wealthier 
candidates and those from larger sub-villages tend to be at an advantage where the elections 
are determined through vote-buying or voting is based solely on shared sub-village identity. 
Since only very limited socioeconomic data are available at the sub-village level, we create an 
approximation of sub-village socioeconomic status by asking village heads to rank each of the 
sub-villages from richest to poorest, and we standardize these rankings on a scale from 0-1. 
We create a proxy for the size of the sub-village using a dummy variable (0=largest sub-village; 
1=other sub-village). 
 
 
5.2  Test of Balance across Treatment and Control Groups 
 
In addition to the five categories of dependent variables discussed above, we include a 
standard set of control variables in all of our regression equations that were specified in 
advance of the analysis. The variables, which come from the baseline survey, are as follows: 
the percentage of the population that is Muslim, the percentage of agricultural households, 
average distance (in kilometers) to the kabupaten capital, urban or rural status, log of monthly 
per capita consumption expenditures (in thousands of rupiah), and the average education level 
of the household head. Since there is little existing literature on the determinants of political 
outcomes in Indonesia, we select these variables based on controls commonly used to predict 
voters’ behavior in other countries, and we make adjustments to the Indonesian context based 
on available data. Several of these controls, including the log of per capita consumption, the 
percentage of agricultural households and the household head’s education level, are proxies 
for socioeconomic status, which are likely to be correlated with voting behavior. The distance 
to the kabupaten capital and urban or rural status variables control for geographic factors, 
which also are likely to be correlated with voting. Finally, the variable on the percentage of the 
population that is Muslim may be relevant, since several of the major political parties in 
Indonesia have Islamic affiliations.  
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We add additional controls in a few of the regression specifications as follows. Where 
President Yudhoyono’s 2009 vote share is the dependent variable, we control for his 2004 
vote share, and likewise, where voter participation in the 2009 presidential election is the 
dependent variable, we control for 2004 voter participation. Data on votes cast in the 2004 
official presidential election are borrowed from Hyde (2010); to estimate voter turnout, we 
combine these data with village adult population data from the most proximate (2005) BPS 
Village Potential Survey (Podes) poverty census as a proxy for the number of eligible voters. 
In the analyses of political participation, political activeness and the local government capacity, 
we include, as additional control variables, two indicators of general levels of community 
participation from the baseline household survey: the average number of community groups 
to which households belong and the average total number of times households have 
participated in community group meetings during the last three months.  
 
Table 1. Test of Balance across Randomized Treatment Groups 
Means Differences – No Fixed Effects Differences – Fixed Effects 
Control 
Variables Control Incentives 
No 
Incentives 
Incentives 
– Control 
No 
Incentives 
– Control 
Incentives 
– No 
Incentives 
Incentives 
– Control 
No 
Incentives 
– Control 
Incentives 
– No 
Incentives 
Percentage_ 
Muslim 78.329 76.634 77.466 -1.6949 -0.8634 0.8315 -1.7748 -0.3964 1.3784 
-39.18 -41.18 -40.06 -6.09 -6.09 -6.05 -1.61 -1.48 -1.4 
Percentage_ 
Agricultural 79.134 74.065 78.75 -5.0696* -0.3841 4.6855* -4.6109 -0.49 4.121 
-20.01 -19.43 -18.08 -3 -2.94 -2.79 -2.96 -2.99 -2.55 
Distance_ 
To_Kabupaten 33.065 35.481 38.379 2.416 5.3141 2.8981 1.4713 3.8981 2.4268 
-26 -25.33 -31.92 -3.9 -4.46 -4.31 -3.38 -3.54 -3.32 
Urban 0.037 0.032 0.011 -0.0043 -0.0252 -0.0209 -0.0031 -0.0235 -0.0204 
-0.19 -0.18 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Log_ 
Consumption 12.373 12.358 12.437 -0.0148 0.0638 0.0786 -0.03 0.0697 0.0996 
-0.54 -0.6 -0.55 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
Education_ 
Household_ 
Head 
2.159 2.452 2.33 0.2931 0.171 -0.1221 0.2474 0.1601 -0.0873 
-1.39 -1.07 -0.94 -0.19 -0.18 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 -0.14 
Sby_ 
Voteshare_ 
2004 
0.483 0.484 0.483 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0057 -0.0012 -0.0069 
-0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Voter_ 
Participation_ 
2004 
0.533 0.532 0.549 -0.0011 0.0167 0.0178 -0.0025 0.0184* 0.0210** 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Community_ 
Groups 2.085 2.108 1.909 0.0222 -0.1763 -0.1984 0.0733 -0.1697 -0.243 
-2.13 -1.8 -1.54 -0.3 -0.29 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 
Community_ 
Meetings 11.829 10.054 9.614 -1.7755 -2.2156 -0.4401 -1.8701 -2.4225 -0.5524 
-20.29 -11.75 -14.55 -2.55 -2.73 -1.98 -2.49 -2.68 -1.98 
Joint test       0.7741 0.716 0.5109 0.6568 0.6691 0.28 
Note: Each observation is a kecamatan. The second row for each variable shows standard deviations for the first three 
columns and robust standard errors for subsequent columns. "DISTANCE_TO_KABUPATEN" is the distance to the 
kabupaten capital in kilometers. "URBAN" is a dummy variable (0=rural; 1=urban) corresponding to a classification system 
of the BPS. "LOG_CONSUMPTION" is the log of monthly per capita household consumption expenditures in thousands of 
rupiah. Household head education levels ("EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_HEAD") are coded on a seven-point scale. 
"COMMUNITY GROUPS" is the number of groups to which all household members belong, and "COMMUNITY 
MEETINGS" is the total number of meetings attended by these groups over the past three months. 
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Table 1 shows that the control variables are well-balanced across the treatment and control 
groups, as we would expect given the randomization process. The first column lists the mean 
and standard deviation of each variable, while the second and third columns show the results 
of OLS regressions of the incentivized treatment and non-incentivized treatment variables 
respectively on each of the control variables. The data are aggregated to the kecamatan level 
and results are shown with and without the stratum-level fixed effects. For example, the vote 
share for President Yudhoyono is 48.3% in the control group, 48.4% in the incentivized 
treatment group, and 48.3% in the non-incentivized group, but the differences are not 
statistically significant. In total, of the 60 differences presented, one is significant at the .05 
level and three are significant at the .10 level, which is no more than would be expected due to 
pure chance. Note also that the p-value of the joint test of significance for all of the control 
variables is not significant in any of the models (with or without fixed effects). 
 
 
5.3  Summary Statistics across Treatment and Control Groups 
 
Table 2 presents the baseline summary statistics on the treatment and control groups for the 
main dependent variables. The data shown is from the endline survey and variables relevant to 
elections at the levels of presidential, legislative, kabupaten head, and village head offices are 
displayed. Each observation represents one of the kecamatan in the experiment. On average, 
across the treatment and control kecamatan, President Yudhoyono won 53.4% of the vote 
share with a victory margin of 17%, while his party won 28.3% of legislative votes. Incumbent 
village heads captured 50.9% of the vote on average, with mean margins of victory of 7.2%. 
The HHI competition measure is close to 50% in both presidential and village head elections. 
Voter participation rates are similar across all elections, around 65%, except for village head 
elections, which have lower participation (54.4%).  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Main Dependent Variables 
  obs mean std min max 
Presidential Elections 
SBY_VOTESHARE 263 0.534 0.10 0.22 0.80 
SBY_MARGIN 263 0.170 0.20 -0.52 0.66 
HHI 263 0.491 0.06 0.36 0.69 
WINNER_MARGIN 263 0.311 0.12 0.04 0.66 
NUMBER_OF_CANDIDATES 262 2.848 0.82 1.12 5.10 
LOG_PARTY_VISITS 236 0.910 0.56 0.00 2.94 
PARTICIPATION 264 0.643 0.08 0.46 0.82 
Legislative Elections 
PD_VOTESHARE 264 0.283 0.16 0.00 0.70 
PARTICIPATION 264 0.646 0.07 0.45 0.82 
Kabupaten Head Elections 
PARTICIPATION 263 0.646 0.08 0.41 0.83 
Village Head Elections 
INCUMBENT_VOTESHARE 238 0.509 0.19 0.06 1.00 
INCUMBENT_MARGIN 231 0.072 0.24 -0.65 0.76 
HHI 262 0.531 0.14 0.27 1.00 
WINNER_MARGIN 261 0.256 0.11 0.02 0.58 
PARTICIPATION 262 0.544 0.07 0.36 0.73 
Note: Each observation represents a kecamatan assigned to one of the PNPM Generasi experimental groups. Data are 
from the World Bank Indonesia's Health and Education Services Endline Survey. The presidential and legislative election 
variables refer to the July and April 2009 elections, respectively.  
 
 
 
VI. RESULTS 
 
 
6.1  Empirical Strategy 
 
Our analyses measure the effects of the PNPM Generasi program on various political 
outcomes using the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression structure: 
 
Yijk=α + β(Treatmentijk) + γj + ζk*Mandiri + εijk, 
 
where i represents a kecamatan, j represents the kabupaten-level stratum, and k represents the 
province level. The “treatment” variable indicates whether the kecamatan was in the control 
group or received one of the treatments. The “Mandiri” x province-level fixed effect term 
corrects for the presence of the PNPM-Mandiri program, where “Mandiri” is a dummy 
variable indicating areas scheduled to receive the PNPM-Mandiri program before the 
randomization of PNPM Generasi took place.17 We disaggregate the treatment group in order 
                                                 
17Kecamatan were allowed to participate in only one community development program during the pilot period, so 
areas randomized into the PNPM Generasi lottery were not eligible to receive PNPM-Mandiri. 
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to test for differential impacts of the randomized “incentivized” treatment variant, where 
some sub-villages were eligible to receive an additional bonus of 20% of funds contingent on 
their performance in achieving the program’s specified health and education goals, compared 
to the “non-incentivized” treatment group. We also test for differential effects of the program 
in the group that had been receiving the program for two years by the time of the endline 
survey (“start in 2007”) versus groups that had been receiving it only for one year (“start in 
2008”). While the political effects of the program might be stronger in areas receiving the 
program for a longer period of time, an alternative hypothesis is that the program might carry 
greater political salience and benefit incumbents more in areas where the program has been 
established just recently.  
 
Table 3. Effects of CCT on Presidential and National Legislative Election Results 
and Political Competition (by incentivized/non-incentivized treatment type) 
 Presidential Elections National Legislative (DPR) Elections 
 
SBY_ 
VOTESHARE 
SBY_ 
MARGIN HHI 
LOG_ 
PARTY_
VISITS 
PD_ 
VOTESHARE 
PD_ 
WINNER 
INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT -0.015 -0.031 -0.004 0.152* 0.013 0.018 
(0.013) (0.025) (0.008) (0.090) (0.018) (0.034) 
NON-INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT -0.012 -0.027 0.001 0.082 0.010 -0.011 
(0.013) (0.025) (0.008) (0.087) (0.018) (0.033) 
SBY_VOTESHARE_2004 0.430*** 0.885*** 0.178*** -0.711 0.419*** 0.832*** 
(0.068) (0.132) (0.041) (0.477) (0.094) (0.174) 
PERCENTAGE_MUSLIM -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
PERCENTAGE_AGRICULTURAL -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
DISTANCE_TO_KABUPATEN 0.000* 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.009 0.037 -0.109*** 0.455 -0.013 0.032 
(0.063) (0.122) (0.038) (0.417) (0.087) (0.162) 
LOG_CONSUMPTION -0.098** -0.155* -0.084*** -0.282 0.015 0.101 
(0.045) (0.087) (0.027) (0.296) (0.063) (0.116) 
EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_HEAD 0.028 0.055 -0.006 0.034 0.041 0.094* 
(0.021) (0.040) (0.012) (0.138) (0.029) (0.054) 
Constant 1.706*** 1.944* 1.488*** 5.430 -0.031 -1.216 
(0.586) (1.136) (0.352) (3.890) (0.817) (1.512) 
Observations 250 250 250 224 251 251 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371 0.365 0.311 0.168 0.530 0.496 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We present the main findings in Tables 3–12. Our main reported results are OLS regressions 
of the five categories of dependent variables on the treatment independent variables, along 
with the control variables and fixed effects. Because kecamatan were randomly assigned to the 
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control group and incentivized or non-incentivized treatment groups, this implies unbiased 
estimation of the effect of assignment to a treatment group, or the “intent-to-treat” (ITT) 
effect. Note that for the analyses where treatment effects are disaggregated by the program 
start year, our estimates of program impacts might be biased if areas that started the program 
later differed from the on-time starters in having different socioeconomic characteristics or 
administrative capacities. We find few significant differences between the on-time and late-
starting groups across all of our key control variables, however, so we cautiously assume that 
delays occurred more or less randomly across the sample, though we cannot rule out the 
possibility that unobservable differences may exist between the two groups. For this reason, 
we focus more on the incentivized versus non-incentivized treatment disaggregation and 
interpret the estimates of treatment effects disaggregated by start year. 
 
For all outcomes with data available from both the baseline survey and the endline survey, we 
take advantage of the longitudinal data using panel regressions. The endline survey includes a 
more comprehensive set of politically-relevant variables than the baseline; the endline survey’s 
timing shortly after the legislative and presidential elections in 2009 provides data on the 
major political events, while no analogous data were collected at the baseline period. In the 
case of indicators that were included in the endline survey only, we rely where possible on 
other data sources and include the lag of the dependent variable as a control variable (for 
example, incumbent vote shares and voter participation in the previous election).  
 
 
6.2  Effects on Support for Incumbents and Political Competition 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the program’s main effects on the electoral support for the incumbent 
president, members of the DPR from the president’s political party and incumbent village 
heads. Overall, the results provide no conclusive evidence that the program benefited then 
incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in his July 2009 re-election, though there is 
strong evidence that the program benefited his party in the April 2009 legislative elections. 
The results also indicate decreased levels of overall political competition in the presidential 
election. The evidence suggests that communities generally tend to attribute the benefits of 
PNPM to the central government rather than to village-level governments, given the absence 
of any results demonstrating program effects on increasing incumbent village heads’ 
probabilities of re-election.  
 
Table 3 examines the effect of the randomized “incentivized” and “non-incentivized” 
treatment variants on presidential and national legislative election results. Each of these 
regression specifications include fixed effects and the core set of control variables that were 
specified in advance of the research, along with an additional variable to control for President 
Yudhoyono’s vote share in the 2004 presidential election. The share of votes for President 
Yudhoyono as a percentage of total votes in the presidential election is not significantly higher 
in treatment kabupaten compared to control kecamatan. President Yudhoyono’s winning margin 
over the second-best candidate—either Megawati or Kalla, depending on the area—also 
shows no significant difference in treatment areas relative to the control group. There is also 
no evidence of significant effects of the program on political competition, although the 
incentivized treatment increases the frequency of political party visits to villages during the 
relevant legislative or presidential campaign season (for example, for political rallies and to 
give campaign speeches), which suggests that PNPM heightens the political importance of 
recipient areas as perceived by political party leaders (p<.10). The results remain very similar if 
the fixed effects and control variables are excluded from the equations and if the incentivized 
and non-incentivized treatment variables are combined into a single treatment category. 
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Table 4. Effects of CCT on Presidential and National Legislative Election Results 
and Political Competition (by treatment start year) 
 
Presidential Elections National Legislative (DPR) Elections 
 
SBY_ 
VOTESHARE 
SBY_ 
MARGIN HHI 
LOG_ 
PARTY
_VISITS 
PD_ 
VOTESHARE 
PD_ 
WINNER 
TREATMENT – start in 2007 -0.014 -0.024 -0.007 0.117 0.008 -0.013 
(0.012) (0.024) (0.007) (0.087) (0.017) (0.032) 
TREATMENT – start in 2008 0.008 -0.000 0.021** 0.109 0.043* 0.090** 
(0.017) (0.034) (0.010) (0.116) (0.024) (0.044) 
SBY_VOTESHARE_2004 0.431*** 0.883*** 0.182*** -0.699 0.428*** 0.855*** 
 (0.068) (0.132) (0.040) (0.480) (0.094) (0.173) 
PERCENTAGE_MUSLIM -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
DISTANCE_TO_KABUPATEN 0.000* 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.008 0.036 -0.109*** 0.461 -0.011 0.031 
 (0.063) (0.122) (0.037) (0.418) (0.087) (0.160) 
LOG_CONSUMPTION -0.103** -0.159* -0.091*** -0.328 -0.001 0.050 
 (0.045) (0.087) (0.027) (0.297) (0.062) (0.115) 
EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_
HEAD 
0.031 0.060 -0.001 0.026 0.045 0.103* 
(0.021) (0.040) (0.012) (0.139) (0.029) (0.053) 
Constant 1.742*** 1.949* 1.560*** 6.118 0.152 -0.616 
 (0.584) (1.135) (0.346) (3.871) (0.810) (1.493) 
Observations 250 250 250 224 251 251 
R-squared       
Adjusted R-squared 0.372 0.363 0.330 0.166 0.536 0.505 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 examines the same set of dependent variables, but disaggregates the treatment variable 
according to the program start year (2007 or 2008) instead of the incentivized or non-
incentivized treatment. These specifications provide evidence that the community development 
program led to significant increases in vote shares for legislative candidates from the president’s 
political party and also reduced overall competition between the presidential candidates, as 
measured by the HHI. The program increased vote shares for legislative candidates from PD by 
4.3% in kecamatan starting the program in 2008 (p<.05), and increased by 9% the probability of a 
PD candidate winning the most votes in the kecamatan (p<.10). The treatment starting in 2008 
also increased the HHI between presidential candidates by 2.1%, relative to the control group 
(p<.05), indicating decreased competition. It is perhaps surprising that these effects occur only 
in areas where the program started in the year immediately prior to the election rather than in 
areas that had been receiving the program for two years before the election, suggesting that the 
political benefits of the program may be short-lived.   
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Table 5. Effects of CCT on Village Head Election Results  
(by incentivized/non-incentivized treatment type) 
 
INCUMBENT_ 
VOTESHARE 
INCUMBENT
_MARGIN HHI 
WINNER_ 
VOTESHARE 
WINNER_ 
MARGIN 
CANDID
ATES 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.038 -0.076 0.018 0.016 0.018 -0.029 
(0.041) (0.058) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.117) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.021 -0.078 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.045 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.119) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
MUSLIM 
0.001* 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** -0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.003** 0.005** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABUPATEN 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
0.099 0.077 0.008 0.007 0.040 0.098 
(0.089) (0.124) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.180) 
EDUCATION_HH
_HEAD 
0.078* 0.132** 0.011 0.014 0.019 -0.041 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.102) 
Constant -1.197 -1.530 0.233 0.300 -0.532 2.128 
(1.105) (1.534) (0.376) (0.345) (0.369) (2.190) 
Observations 166 159 461 461 442 463 
R-squared 0.075 0.069     
Number of 
kecamatan 
- - 261 261 260 261 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While PNPM Generasi had certain effects on national-level political incumbents, the evidence 
indicates no overall effects on incumbent politicians at the village level. The regression models 
in Tables 5 show no significant effects of the program on incumbent village heads’ vote shares 
or winning margins. There are also no significant impacts on political competition as 
measured by the winner’s vote shares, victory margins, or the HHI constructed using village 
head candidate vote share data. Finally, we examine whether the program affects the number 
of candidates who decide to enter the village head electoral race as an alternative basic 
measure of political competition, but again we find no significant effects. In each of these 
regressions, we include the same set of control variables as used in the previous regressions, 
with the exception of the 2004 presidential vote share variable (no analogous incumbent’s 
vote share data exists for previous village head elections). Table 5 disaggregates the treatment 
variable by the incentivized variant, while Table 6 disaggregates the treatment by start year. 
The results in Table 6 are similar to Table 5 with no coefficients achieving significance at the 
5% level. To summarize, we find evidence that PNPM Generasi increased vote shares of 
national legislature members from the president’s PD and reduced political competition in the 
presidential race in areas that received PNPM Generasi in 2008, but we do not find that the 
program significantly affected vote shares for the incumbent president himself or for the 
village head incumbents.   
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Table 6. Effects of CCT on Village Head Election Results (by treatment start year) 
 
INCUMBENT_ 
VOTESHARE 
INCUMBENT_
MARGIN HHI 
WINNER_ 
VOTESHARE 
WINNER_ 
MARGIN CANDIDATES 
TREATMENT - 
start in 2007 
-0.041 -0.092* 0.007 0.008 0.012 -0.054 
(0.038) (0.052) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.107) 
TREATMENT - 
start in 2008 
-0.045 -0.133* -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 
(0.048) (0.067) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.140) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
MUSLIM 
0.001* 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.003** 0.005** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABUPATEN 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
0.100 0.071 0.008 0.007 0.041 0.095 
(0.089) (0.123) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.180) 
EDUCATION_ 
HH_HEAD 
0.078* 0.137** 0.011 0.014 0.020 -0.043 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.102) 
Constant -1.197 -1.453 0.236 0.301 -0.541 2.168 
(1.102) (1.520) (0.376) (0.345) (0.369) (2.189) 
Observations 166 159 461 461 442 463 
R-squared 0.079 0.085 
Number of 
kecamatan - - 261 261 260 261 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
6.3  Effects on Voter Participation 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the effects of PNPM Generasi on voter participation in national and 
local elections respectively. We find no significant effects of the program on voter turnout in 
the April and July 2009 elections (for the legislative and presidential elections, respectively), 
nor is there evidence that the program affects voter turnout in village head elections. 
 
Table 7 examines the overall voter participation and participation disaggregated by gender in 
the presidential and legislative elections; we find no significant changes in PNPM Generasi 
treatment kecamatan relative to control kecamatan. The set of controls included is the same as in 
the equations in tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, except that the incumbent’s vote share in the 2004 
presidential election is replaced with voter turnout. We cross-check the findings using two 
different sources of available data: (i) voter turnout data, collected during interviews with 
village heads; and (ii) responses from individuals in the household survey, who were asked 
whether they voted in the most recent legislative, presidential, and village head elections. In 
both cases, the findings are similar. The results shown here are for the incentivized and non-
incentivized treatments; the findings are comparable if disaggregated by program start year 
(not shown). 
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Table 7. Effects of CCT on Voter Participation in Presidential and National 
Legislative Elections (by incentivized/non-incentivized treatment type) 
  Presidential Elections 
National Legislative (DPR) 
Elections  
Village head survey data Household survey data 
  Total Men  Women Total  Men Women Total Men Women 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.001 0.003 0.000  0.003 -0.009 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.001 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.003  -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
VOTER_ 
PARTICIPATION_
2004 
0.224*** 0.113*** 0.068*  0.075** -0.102 0.177 0.198*** 0.087** 0.051 
(0.067) (0.039) (0.040)  (0.033) (0.112) (0.114) (0.058) (0.036) (0.038) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
MUSLIM 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABUPATEN 
0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
URBAN 0.120** 0.080*** 0.042  0.012 0.036 -0.024 0.089** 0.064** 0.023 
 (0.048) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.023) (0.081) (0.081) (0.042) (0.026) (0.027) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.002 -0.025 0.026  -0.016 -0.016 0.001 -0.025 -0.020 0.004 
(0.034) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.058) (0.058) (0.030) (0.018) (0.019) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.000 -0.005 -0.001  0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
COMMUNITY_ 
GROUPS 
-0.022 -0.013 -0.009  0.011 0.012 -0.000 -0.020 -0.019** -0.013 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
COMMUNITY_ 
MEETINGS 
0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.699 0.633** 0.023  1.114*** 0.346 0.769 0.960** 0.560** 0.294 
 (0.447) (0.261) (0.264)  (0.219) (0.750) (0.759) (0.389) (0.240) (0.252) 
Observations 251 248 248  251 251 251 251 250 250 
R-squared           
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.375 0.352 0.361  0.062 0.583 0.585 0.470 0.405 0.401 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to the null effects of PNPM Generasi on voter participation in national elections, the 
program does not seem to affect village head election turnout in either the incentivized or 
non-incentivized samples (see Table 8). The results are similar when the treatment variable is 
disaggregated by program start year.  
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Table 8. Effects of CCT on Voter Participation in Local Elections 
Kabupaten Head Elections Village Head Elections 
 
Village head survey Household survey 
Village 
head 
survey 
Household survey 
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Total Men Women 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.002 0.006 -0.001 -0.031 -0.038 0.007 0.002 0.009 -0.022 0.032 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.036) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011 0.028 -0.039 -0.014 -0.008 -0.018 0.010 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.030) (0.033) (0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.035) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
MUSLIM 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.004** -0.004* 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002* 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABPUATEN 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.049 0.002 -0.003 -0.239** -0.023 -0.216  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.045) (0.030) (0.028) (0.101) (0.150) (0.164)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
0.022 -0.001 0.024 0.075 -0.110 0.184 0.005 0.066* -0.050 0.116 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.020) (0.071) (0.105) (0.115) (0.018) (0.037) (0.078) (0.084) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.018 0.005 0.010 -0.018 -0.026 0.008 0.019** 0.010 -0.024 0.034 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.033) (0.049) (0.054) (0.010) (0.017) (0.036) (0.039) 
COMMUNITY_ 
GROUPS 
-0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.023 0.017 0.006 -0.005 0.020 0.060 -0.040 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.034) (0.050) (0.055) (0.008) (0.019) (0.040) (0.042) 
COMMUNITY_ 
MEETINGS 
0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.003 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.388 0.359 0.057 0.146 1.495 -1.349 0.463** 0.057 0.593 -0.536 
 (0.415) (0.280) (0.257) (0.934) (1.389) (1.520) (0.222) (0.477) (1.009) (1.081) 
Observations 263 253 253 235 235 235 461 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.563 0.511 0.533 0.347 0.438 0.408 - 0.167 0.412 0.379 
Number of 
kecamatan 
- - - - - - 261 - - - 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
6.4  Effects on Political Access/Activity and Local Government 
Capacity 
 
This section tests whether the PNPM Generasi program improves communities’ access to 
local politicians and the political activeness of community members. We examine the 
frequency of visits to communities by political party representatives during the campaign 
season, meetings between village leaders and higher-level government officials, and protests 
from community members to village-level and kabupaten-level governments.  
 
Several robust findings in Table 9 indicate that PNPM Generasi generally increases local 
communities’ access to higher-level political officials. First, we observe some evidence that the 
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program increases the level of contact between village-level officials and higher-ranked 
officials at the level of the DPR. The positive coefficients of .045 and .062 on the “Invited” 
and “Was_Visited” variables, respectively (p<.10 and p<.05) suggest that the non-incentivized 
PNPM Generasi kecamatan government officials are both more likely to invite and to be visited 
by DPR officials. Village heads were also asked to report the frequency of visits of other tiers 
of government officials, including the members of kabupaten- and provincial-level Houses of 
Representatives (DPRD) and kabupaten heads, but there were no significant changes in these 
variables across treatment and control groups. Together with the previous findings, these 
results support the fact that PNPM Generasi seems to have been politically relevant 
particularly for candidates in the national legislative assembly. 
 
Table 9. Effects of CCT on Political Access and Political Activity 
DPR member Kabupaten head 
 
Invited Was_ Invited 
Visite
d 
Was_
Visited Invited 
Was_
Invited Visited 
Was_ 
Visited Protests 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.010 -0.016 0.001 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.003 -0.009 0.110 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.018) (0.029) (0.046) (0.037) (0.054) (0.050) (0.101) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.045* -0.004 0.011 0.062** 0.051 -0.005 0.005 0.055 0.268*** 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028) (0.045) (0.037) (0.053) (0.049) - 
PERCENTAGE_ 
MUSLIM 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.001 0.001** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.008 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABUPATEN 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
URBAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.483) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.060 0.010 -0.038 0.048 0.132 0.079 0.247** -0.087 0.795** 
(0.056) (0.028) (0.041) (0.066) (0.106) (0.087) (0.125) (0.116) (0.342) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.036 0.014 0.004 0.028 -0.091* -0.010 -0.123** -0.043 -0.227 
(0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.031) (0.049) (0.040) (0.058) (0.054) (0.160) 
COMMUNITY_ 
GROUPS 
0.029 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.050 0.022 0.097 0.174*** 0.121 
(0.027) (0.014) (0.020) (0.032) (0.051) (0.042) (0.060) (0.056) (0.156) 
COMMUNITY_ 
MEETINGS 
-0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 -0.015** -0.010 -0.004 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) 
Constant 0.591 -0.299 0.296 -0.541 -1.215 -0.727 -2.169 1.532 -8.716* 
 (0.717) (0.365) (0.528) (0.854) (1.366) (1.115) (1.610) (1.498) (4.451) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 264 
R-squared 0.146 0.145 0.180 0.164 0.201 0.180 0.263 0.282 0.182 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We additionally find that the incidence of protests from community members to the 
kabupaten-level government increases significantly by 26.8% in the non-incentivized treatment 
group relative to the control group. The authors assume this indicates that the treatment 
heightens awareness of the channels through which to express political demands among the 
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community members, although an increase in protests could potentially indicate increased 
public dissatisfaction with the political incumbents in PNPM Generasi areas. We find the 
latter explanation less compelling, however, given the previous evidence on the program’s role 
in increasing political activities in communities as well as evidence presented in the following 
section that the program increases satisfaction with kabupaten-level governments. Indeed, the 
observed increase in political activity and higher demands of voters in treatment areas fits well 
with the earlier finding that PNPM Generasi increases the political importance of these areas. 
 
Table 10. Effects of CCT on Local Government Capacity 
  
Village Gvt. 
Participation 
Existence of 
BPD 
Number of BPD 
Meetings 
INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT 0.012 0.010** 0.084 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.231) 
NON-INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT 0.008 0.004 0.013 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.230) 
PERCENTAGE_MUSLIM 0.001** -0.000 0.003 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.012) 
PERCENTAGE_AGRICULTURAL 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
DISTANCE_TO_KABUPATEN -0.000 0.000 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
LOG_CONSUMPTION 0.020 -0.004 1.556*** 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.480) 
EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_HEAD 0.014 0.001 -0.433* 
(0.012) (0.005) (0.256) 
COMMUNITY_GROUPS 0.055*** -0.001 -0.028 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.212) 
COMMUNITY_MEETINGS -0.002 -0.001 0.032 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.028) 
Constant -0.380 1.071*** -15.434** 
(0.273) (0.121) (6.063) 
Observations 463 463 463 
Number of kecamatan 261 261 261 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, we find that PNPM Generasi does not seem to affect the functioning of BPDs (see 
Table 10). Aside from a small and marginally significant increased probability that the BPD 
exists in incentivized treatment areas (p<.10), there is no discernible increase in the percentage 
of areas reporting that a functional BPD exists nor any increased frequency in BPD meetings 
reported to have occurred in the three-month period prior to the endline survey. Further, 
there is no significant increase in participation in village government as reported by household 
respondents. In summary, we find in this section that PNPM Generasi increases both the 
political activity among the communities and the frequency of contact between communities 
and higher-level officials, as measured by meetings or invitations between villages and national 
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assembly members as well as by the number political protests to kabupaten-level governments. 
At the same time, the program has no discernible impact on the local government capacity. 
 
 
6.5  Effects on Satisfaction with Public Services 
 
To measure changes in satisfaction with government as a result of the PNPM Generasi 
program, surveyed households were asked to report whether they have noticed any change in 
the quality of government administrative services during the past two years. Table 11 shows 
that while households in PNPM Generasi areas do not report any improvement or changes in 
the satisfaction with village-level government services, those in the incentivized treatment 
group report improvements in kabupaten-level government administrative services relative to 
the control group (p<.05) with a magnitude over 10%. Similarly, the coefficient on satisfaction 
with kabupaten-level administrative services in the incentivized treatment group is significant 
(p<.05), with a magnitude of 8%. This evidence suggests that the kabupaten-level governments 
may receive some credit for PNPM Generasi program, while village governments are not 
similarly rewarded. 
 
Table 11. Effects of CCT on Satisfaction with Local Government Administrative 
Services (by incentivized treatment type) 
Kabupaten-level government Village-level government 
 
Perception of 
Improvement Satisfaction 
Perception of 
Improvement Satisfaction 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.103** 0.100** 0.080** 0.085** 0.036 0.015 0.009 0.003 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.028 0.020 0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.009 -0.037 -0.036* 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
MUSLIM 
-0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004** -0.001*** -0.004** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABUPTEN 
0.002** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
URBAN 0.014 0.208 -0.090 0.005 -0.132 0.165 -0.176* 0.034 
 (0.188) (0.206) (0.149) (0.168) (0.139) (0.135) (0.099) (0.102) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.180 -0.095 0.058 0.004 0.021 0.019 0.110* -0.012 
(0.121) (0.146) (0.096) (0.119) (0.089) (0.095) (0.063) (0.073) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.101* 0.026 0.015 -0.016 0.030 -0.040 -0.016 -0.033 
(0.057) (0.068) (0.045) (0.055) (0.042) (0.044) (0.030) (0.034) 
Constant 3.400** 2.550 0.622 1.438 1.415 2.047 0.384 2.288** 
 (1.518) (1.901) (1.209) (1.549) (1.126) (1.244) (0.798) (0.945) 
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 
R-squared 0.072 0.278 0.087 0.256 0.056 0.428 0.117 0.386 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The SMERU Research Institute 28
6.6  Effects on Entry into the Village Head Office 
 
Finally, we test the effects of the PNPM Generasi program on increasing opportunities for 
individuals from different groups to enter local politics as candidates and/or winners in village 
head elections (see Table 12). We focus on the entry of candidates who have traditionally been 
very poorly represented in village politics, including women and members of smaller or poorer 
sub-villages. We also explore whether the program affects the age or education level of village 
heads who are elected to office. 
 
Table 12. Effects of CCT on Entry of Under-Represented Groups to  
Village Head Position 
 
Women Age Education Level Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
Number of 
Candidates 
Percentag
e Votes Under 40 Under 50 
High 
School College 
Socio-
Economi
c Rank 
Population 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.016 0.004 -0.150*** -0.049 -0.094** 0.002 -0.005 0.028 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.021) (0.033) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.130*** -0.042 -0.041 -0.010 -0.011 0.041 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.042) (0.021) (0.033) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.005* -0.000 0.004** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
PERCENTAGE_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
KABUPATEN 
0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.022 0.003 -0.183 -0.098 -0.184* -0.026 -0.020 0.081 
(0.035) (0.018) (0.114) (0.108) (0.103) (0.098) (0.042) (0.066) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.044** 0.021** -0.154*** -0.088* 0.025 -0.002 0.012 -0.070* 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.053) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.023) (0.036) 
Constant 0.175 -0.081 3.340** 2.197 3.183** -0.020 0.968* -0.967 
 (0.444) (0.234) (1.482) (1.401) (1.340) (1.273) (0.540) (0.842) 
Observations 463 461 237 237 237 237 463 461 
R-squared - - 0.282 0.203 0.294 0.188 - - 
Number of 
kecamatan 
261 261 - - - - 261 261 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The findings are once again somewhat mixed: PNPM Generasi does not seem to affect the 
number of female candidates running for the village head office nor the vote shares garnered 
by female candidates in either the incentivized or non-incentivized treatments. Counter to our 
initial hypothesis that the program might facilitate the election of younger village heads, it 
seems that the program in fact encourages the election of older leaders, given the highly 
significant decreases of 15% and 13% in the number of village heads under the age of 40 in 
the incentivized and non-incentivized treatments respectively.18 One potential explanation of 
this fact might be that the village head positions become more sought-after once villages 
                                                 
18The coefficients are in the same direction if this definition is adjusted to village heads under the age of 50 
though they are no longer significant at the 5% level. 
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receive PNPM funds (for example, since presumably the village head has some influence over 
these funds), and thus older (and presumably wealthier) candidates are more motivated to 
enter or win these races. Finally, no significant effects of the program are detected on the 
election of candidates from poorer or smaller sub-villages as village heads, and PNPM 
Generasi is not associated with any consistent overall change in the education levels of elected 
village heads. Overall, PNPM Generasi does not strongly impact the characteristics of village 
heads who were elected after the start of the program, except for decreasing the number of 
younger village heads. 
 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 
Overall, we find that PNPM Generasi’s strongest political effects include rewarding DPR 
candidates affiliated with the incumbent president’s PD, decreasing competition in the 
presidential election, and increasing the satisfaction with kabupaten-level government services. 
While it may not seem surprising that a social transfer program is politically popular, the 
results are noteworthy in several respects. First, it is interesting to note that the program did 
not significantly increase the support for the incumbent president himself; instead, legislative 
candidates from the PD benefited from the program by receiving higher vote shares in the 
PNPM Generasi areas. This result warrants further research, including a qualitative 
exploration of whom the respondents credit for the program. It is possible that PNPM 
Generasi beneficiaries tend to attribute the program to their legislative representatives rather 
than to the president; voters might make this assumption, for example, if they are aware that 
the program benefitted their own region and was not implemented everywhere across the 
nation. An alternative explanation, however, might be simply that voter preferences for 
presidential candidates tend to be stronger than their preferences for legislative candidates, 
and so the latter may be easier to influence and more responsive to the receipt of PNPM 
Generasi’s program benefits. 
 
The overall results are particularly surprising because unlike traditional clientelistic programs, 
PNPM Generasi did not allow for benefits to be easily politically manipulated, and 
mechanisms against such risks were explicitly built into the program design; funds were to be 
distributed according to an ongoing regular schedule, contingent on meeting the health and 
education benchmarks. Moreover, program benefits could not easily be withdrawn in case the 
recipients did not vote for incumbent politicians. The re-election of PD legislators or 
President Yudhoyono was unlikely to directly affect the likelihood that communities already 
receiving the PNPM program would continue receiving it. Indeed, all the communities 
participating in PNPM Generasi before the election continued to receive the program 
regardless of their behavior during the 2009 elections. However, program participants may not 
have been fully aware that PNPM was not associated with a particular political party, and since 
the program was new and had yet to withstand a change in political incumbents, it may have 
been rational for voters to expect the likelihood of the program continuing to be higher if the 
PD remained in power. 
 
These findings can plausibly be interpreted as evidence of retrospective voting, where 
politicians are rewarded for implementing good policies, rather than as evidence of vote-
buying. Although the program was not officially attributed to a political party, and we have 
not found any evidence that politicians explicitly tried to manipulate voters by claiming that it 
was, households may still have assumed the opposite, or they may have used their votes to 
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express reciprocity toward incumbents. One public statement by a member of the government 
of West Papua Province, Abraham Atururi, during the distribution of funds in the province, 
reflects what may have been a common sentiment among the public that voting for the PD 
would make receipt of PNPM more likely in the future: “This fund will continue to be offered 
to us [West Papuans] if the president is reelected. That's why I pray he will be our president 
again.” (The Jakarta Post, 2009b) 
 
In terms of the policy implications, the finding that the CCT model analyzed here can 
potentially offer political rewards to incumbents generally seems to bode well for the future 
political sustainability of such programs. Regardless of the anti-poverty benefits associated 
with such a program, it could be difficult to gain long-term political support for a program 
that is not politically popular. While CCTs tend to limit politicians’ ability to target the 
program toward particular groups (for example, core supporters, and swing voters) as 
compared with traditional clientelistic programs, they may offer the potential benefit of greater 
legitimacy in the selection process where technical poverty criteria are used to determine 
beneficiaries. Our finding that the political benefits of the program may be most pronounced 
during its first year may raise the possibility that it might be wise, at least from a purely 
political standpoint, for governments to repackage such programs every few years, for 
example, under new names, or with slightly different variations in program rules to keep in 
check the risk of program discontinuation due to changes in political administration. The 
experience of Mexico’s Progresa program, initiated under Ernesto Zedillo’s PRI 
administration and revamped under the new name of Oportunidades soon after Vincente Fox 
of the PAN party took power, provides one such example where repackaging of the old 
program when the new administration took power was a useful political strategy that 
safeguarded its continuation. At the same time, it is important for such programs to ensure 
that the targeting process used to determine beneficiaries is free from political influences.  
 
As expected, given that the central government was the architect of the PNPM Generasi 
program, the electoral benefits of the program are attributed mainly to politicians involved in 
national-level politics, including legislative assembly candidates from the president’s party. We 
also detect positive effects on perceptions of kabupaten-level government administrative 
service provision, which indicates that credit for the program may be somewhat disbursed 
between different levels of government. It could be argued that kabupaten-level governments 
deserve a share of the political rewards associated with the program, given that its successful 
functioning depends on the local officials’ compliance with the program rules delineated by 
the central government. The same argument could be applied to village leaders; we do not 
detect, however, any effects of the program on satisfaction with village-level government. 
 
Finally, from a policy perspective, the null results of the program on voter participation rates are 
perhaps somewhat surprising. While they do not negate the possibility that PNPM Generasi may 
have increased the levels of community participation and empowerment, they also suggest that any 
such effects do not extend to the sphere of formal politics. Of course, one potential explanation 
may be that the time frame of the study (approximately two years) is insufficient to expect that 
meaningful changes in political participation would take effect. Additionally, Indonesia’s already 
high historical baseline rates of voter participation (over 50% in the 2004 presidential election, for 
example) may make it particularly difficult to further increase these rates. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
There is surprisingly little persuasive empirical evidence on how voters reward incumbent 
governments when desirable policies are implemented. The present research is one of only a 
small handful of studies that estimate the magnitude of the impact of a social transfer program 
on voting behavior with a credible exogenous source of variation in the independent variable. 
It is also the first study the authors are aware of that estimates the political effects of a CCT 
program whose benefits are distributed at the community level rather than to individual 
households. We are unable to distinguish whether the results are observed due to the specific 
community-based aspect of the program or due to other features common to all CCT 
programs; this remains a question for future research. 
 
Our research opens up several avenues for future academic and policy studies. First, there is 
the question of the extent to which our findings can be generalised. Our research on PNPM 
Generasi is limited to rural areas, where most of Indonesia’s population lives, but we cannot 
assume that the same effects would be found in urban areas, where voters tend to be better 
informed and may generally exhibit different types of political behavior. The extent to which 
our findings are applicable to other countries is also uncertain, though we have no particular 
reason to expect that our findings should not be applicable, at least to some degree, to other 
developing democracies; although Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim, research indicates 
that its voters pay little heed to religious affiliations and inducements, and instead adhere 
primarily to the same party and leadership cues as voters in other emerging democracies 
(Liddle and Mujani, 2007). Our findings on electoral rewards to incumbents are similar to 
those of De La O (2013), though in contrast to her results, we do not find positive effects of 
the program on voter participation.  
 
Another area for further research would be to explore the political effects of the CCT 
programs using a longer time horizon than the two-year period of this study. In particular, it 
would be useful to test whether any effect of CCTs on voter participation could be detected 
over a longer term. 
 
Finally, future research could explore whether CCTs political effects differ depending on a 
variety of household-level or region-level characteristics, such as poverty levels, previous 
political affiliations, and ethnic or religious factors. Insight into this would be useful in 
identifying potential causal mechanisms behind the results observed in this study. It would 
also be interesting to test whether the political impact of CCTs depends on the programs’ 
achievement of the stated goals of improvement in health and education. If possible, future 
research could also link data on the distribution of program benefits with voting data at the 
individual or household level. Such comparison would allow researchers to trace more directly 
the source of any political effects of the program, including whether any changes in the 
support for the incumbent or voter participation can be associated specifically with program 
recipients or non-recipients. 
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